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I. INTRODUCTION 
Employers have begun using more sophisticated, high-tech methods 
to monitor employee behavior.  Employers test employees for AIDS and 
drug use; videotape them; electronically monitor their computer use, 
Internet use, emails, text messages, and phone calls; and track their 
movements with Global Positioning System (GPS) technology.1  
Employers can even use radio frequency chips to constantly monitor an 
employee’s location.2  While employers clearly have the right to monitor 
employee behavior, that right is not limitless.  The tort of intrusion on 
seclusion creates one such limit. 
The extent to which the intrusion on seclusion tort protects employee 
privacy under Kansas law is, however, somewhat of a mystery.  The 
Kansas Supreme Court has not yet squarely addressed an employee’s 
intrusion on seclusion claim against an employer or articulated a specific 
approach to these claims.  The Kansas Supreme Court’s analysis of 
intrusion on seclusion claims in the creditor–debtor context does, 
however, suggest how the court would approach an intrusion on 
seclusion claim in the employment context.  Numerous federal court 
cases analyzing intrusion on seclusion claims under Kansas law in the 
employment context also serve as a guide to predicting how Kansas 
courts would rule on these claims.  This Article synthesizes current 
                                                          
 *  Clinical Associate Professor and the Robert A. Schroeder Teaching Professor, University 
of Kansas School of Law.  The author thanks KU Wheat Law Library professors and staff for the 
extensive research they provided for this Article. 
 1.  Robert Sprague, From Taylorism to the Omnipticon: Expanding Employee Surveillance 
Beyond the Workplace, 25 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 3, 34 (2007); see also Shefali 
N. Baxi & Alisa A. Nickel, Big Brother or Better Business: Striking a Balance in the Workplace, 4 
KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 137, 137–38 (1994–1995). 
 2.  Sprague, supra note 1, at 34; see also Rachel Emma Silverman, Tracking Sensors Invade 
the Workplace, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2013, at B1. 
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intrusion on seclusion law in Kansas and suggests an approach for 
Kansas courts to follow when analyzing an intrusion upon seclusion 
claim in the employment context.  It also collects and reviews existing 
federal cases analyzing intrusion on seclusion claims in the employment 
context under Kansas law. 
Kansas courts should approach an intrusion on seclusion claim in the 
employment context as they have approached these claims in the 
creditor–debtor context: Courts must balance the respective rights and 
interests of the parties.  To determine whether an employer has invaded 
an employee’s privacy, courts must determine whether the employer’s 
legitimate business interest in the information outweighs the employee’s 
privacy interest.  At least one federal court applying Kansas intrusion on 
seclusion law has used this approach, and it is consistent with the 
approach of other states. 
Part II summarizes Kansas intrusion on seclusion law, and Part III 
summarizes that law as applied in the creditor–debtor context.  Part IV 
explains how a balancing of interests similar to that used in the creditor–
debtor context will operate in the employment context.  Part V surveys 
intrusion on seclusion claims in the employment context under Kansas 
law, organized by the type of alleged intrusion.  The survey also includes 
some cases analyzing employee privacy claims against a government 
employer under federal law.  Part VI concludes. 
The focus of this Article is the intrusion on seclusion tort claim, 
which is only one part of a web of common law, statutory, and 
constitutional provisions that purport to protect individuals’ privacy.3  
The Article does not address Kansas statutory or constitutional privacy 
protections.  It does not analyze in any depth federal statutes or privacy 
violations based on the United States Constitution.  Some federal cases 
                                                          
 3.  For Kansans employed by private employers, the tort “remains the bedrock protection 
against unwarranted intrusions.”  Daniel P. O’Gorman, Looking out for Your Employees: Employers’ 
Surreptitious Physical Surveillance of Employees and the Tort of Invasion of Privacy, 85 NEB. L. 
REV. 212, 218 (2006) (quoting Jeremy Friedman, Note, Prying Eyes in the Sky: Visual Aerial 
Surveillance of Private Residences as a Tort, 4 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 24 (2003)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Federal constitutional provisions generally restrain only government 
actors, “federal legislation prohibits only surveillance that interferes with employees’ self-organizing 
efforts and activities,” and few employees have a contract of employment that would prohibit 
surveillance or protect particular privacy interests.  Id. at 217–18.  And Kansas has not enacted a 
statute generally authorizing a private cause of action for invasion of privacy.  See J. Lyn Entrikin, 
The Right to be Let Alone: The Kansas Right of Privacy 82 (Univ. of Ark. at Little Rock, William H. 
Bowen Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 12-05, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=215 
6111 (noting that the Kansas legislature “has not authorized private claims for invasion of privacy, 
except under very narrow circumstances involving violation[s] of specific criminal procedure 
statutes”). 
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governing employee privacy claims under the Fourth Amendment are 
included in the survey because the courts’ reasoning might influence a 
Kansas court’s recognition of an employee privacy interest or its 
balancing of employer–employee interests in an intrusion on seclusion 
tort claim. 
II. INTRUSION ON SECLUSION IN KANSAS 
The common law right of privacy in Kansas stems from the right to 
be left alone and to live without the public’s unwarranted intrusion into 
“matters with which the public is not necessarily concerned.”4  The right 
is “relative to the customs of the time and place, and it is determined by 
the norm of the ordinary man.”5  It is concerned primarily with injury to 
a person’s emotions and mental suffering.6 
Kansas has adopted the right of privacy as analyzed in the 
Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts, chapter 28A.  Kansas courts 
recognize four types of invasion of privacy: (1) unreasonable intrusion 
on the seclusion of another; (2) appropriation of another’s name or 
likeness; (3) unreasonable publicity given to another’s private life; and 
(4) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the 
public.7  For an invasion of privacy to be actionable, its manner or nature 
must “outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation in a 
person of ordinary sensibilities.”8 
Kansas courts first recognized an intrusion on seclusion claim in 
Froelich v. Adair.9  Liability results when a person (1) intentionally (2) 
intrudes, physically or otherwise, on the solitude or seclusion of another, 
or into his private affairs or concerns, and (3) the intrusion is highly 
                                                          
 4.  Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., 262 P.2d 808, 812 (Kan. 1953) (quoting 41 AM. JUR. 
Privacy § 2). 
 5.  Id. at 813 (quoting 41 AM. JUR. Privacy § 12). 
 6.  Froelich v. Adair, 516 P.2d 993, 996 (Kan. 1973). 
 7.  Vespa v. Safety Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 P.2d 878, 881 (Kan. 1976) (quoting Dotson 
v. McLaughlin, 531 P.2d 1, syl. ¶ 1 (Kan. 1982)); see also PIK CIVIL 4TH § 127.61 (2011) (Right of 
Privacy). 
 8.  Johnson, 262 P.2d at 812 (quoting 41 AM. JUR. Privacy § 2). 
 9.  516 P.2d at 996.  The Kansas Supreme Court first recognized a common law right of 
privacy in Kunz v. Allen, 172 P. 532, 532 (Kan. 1918), allowing a plaintiff to recover for the 
misappropriation of her name or likeness.  The court recognized claims for publicity given to private 
facts in 1972 and false light publicity in 1977.  Entrikin, supra note 3, at 15.  For a thorough history 
of the Kansas right of privacy, see generally id. 
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offensive to the reasonable person.10  Unlike the other privacy torts 
recognized, intrusion on seclusion does not require publication.11 
The defendant’s intrusion must be intentional.12  According to the 
Restatement (Second), a person acts intentionally when she desires to 
cause the consequences of her actions or believes the consequences are 
substantially certain to result from them.13  A person need not intend to 
cause harm, but rather must intend to “bring about a result which will 
invade the interests of another in a way [the] law forbids.”14  Malice is 
not required. 
Kansas cases do not specifically describe what constitutes solitude or 
seclusion, but the Kansas Court of Appeals has referred to the idea as an 
individual’s “zone of privacy.”  For an actionable invasion or intrusion, a 
defendant must place herself physically, or by means of her senses, 
within plaintiff’s zone of privacy.15  The essence of the tort is the right to 
be left alone, so the defendant must invade an area in which a plaintiff 
could reasonably expect to be left alone or invade a matter a plaintiff 
could reasonably consider private.16  Thus, this “zone of privacy” likely 
includes matters or information in which a plaintiff may reasonably 
expect privacy. 
The interference may be a physical intrusion or one in which the 
defendant uses her sensory faculties.17  It may also be by “some other 
form of investigation or examination into his private concerns, as by 
opening his private and personal mail, searching his safe or his wallet, 
examining his private bank account, or compelling him by a forged court 
order to permit an inspection of his personal documents.”18 
A person is generally not in seclusion if the person is in public.19  
And a matter is generally not private if the matter is already exposed to 
                                                          
 10.  Vespa, 549 P.2d at 881. 
 11.  Adair, 516 P.2d at 997; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977).  
Generally, the tort is based on the manner in which an individual obtains information; the intrusion 
itself creates liability even without publication or use.  See Adair, 516 P.2d at 997; see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b. 
 12.  Intent has not been an issue in most employee intrusion on seclusion claims thus far 
analyzed under Kansas law.  See infra Part V. 
 13.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). 
 14.  See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 8, at 36 (5th 
ed. 1984). 
 15.  Finlay v. Finlay, 856 P.2d 183, 190 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985). 
 16.  See id. at 189–90. 
 17.  Id. at 189. 
 18.  Id. at 189–90 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977)). 
 19.  See Hartman v. Meredith Corp., 638 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (D. Kan. 1986) (stating that 
plaintiffs must show defendant intruded on some aspect of their private affairs and finding that a 
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the public.20  Even in a public place, however, a person may keep some 
matters from the public gaze and maintain privacy in those matters.  
Thus, a person does not intrude on another’s seclusion by examining 
public records about her or by observing her on a public street.  But an 
intrusion may occur, for example, if a person takes a picture of a 
woman’s underwear inadvertently exposed while she is walking on a 
public street.21 
Determining whether a matter or information is private or public has 
become increasingly difficult with advancing technologies.  So while it 
may be clear that you do not intrude on a person’s seclusion by 
observing her on a public street, it is not clear, for example, whether you 
invade her privacy by tracking all her movements on public streets for a 
long period of time with GPS technology.22  Whether a matter or 
information is private can also be more difficult to discern in the 
employment context where employers and employees share physical 
space, property, and information.  Determining, for example, whether 
employees can expect privacy in personal phone calls made on 
employer-owned phone equipment or in personal files on company-
owned computers, involves complex, fact-specific inquiries.23 
Even if an intrusion on seclusion has occurred, however, it will not 
be actionable unless it is highly offensive to a reasonable person.  An 
intrusion is highly offensive only when it is a substantial intrusion and 
the result of conduct to which an ordinary and reasonable person would 
strongly object.24  Whether an intrusion is highly offensive depends on 
the totality of the circumstances.25  Both the manner and nature of the 
intrusion matter: They must outrage a reasonable person or cause a 
reasonable person mental suffering or humiliation.26 
                                                                                                                       
 
plaintiff bail bondsman standing with clients in open court could not sue a broadcaster for intrusion 
on seclusion). 
 20.  Peterson v. Moldofsky, No. 07–2603–EFM, 2009 WL 3126229, at *4 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 
2009).  Further, “under Kansas law the disclosure of properly obtained information does not 
constitute an intrusion sufficient to make out a claim of invasion of privacy under the theory of 
intrusion upon seclusion.”  Id. at *3. 
 21.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c. 
 22.  See discussion infra Part V.H. 
 23.  See discussion infra Part V.E–G. 
 24.  Moore v. R.Z. Sims Chevrolet-Subaru, Inc., 738 P.2d 852, 857 (Kan. 1987) (quoting 
Froelich v. Werbin, 548 P.2d 482, 485 (Kan.1976)). 
 25.  See, e.g., Werner v. Kliewer, 710 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Kan. 1985) (finding that a doctor’s 
disclosure of intimate facts about a mother’s mental condition “would ordinarily be highly 
objectionable,” but was not in this case because the doctor communicated the information to a judge 
responsible for the safety of her children). 
 26.  Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., 262 P.2d 808, 812 (Kan. 1953); Moore, 738 P.2d at 856. 
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Consent is a complete defense to an intrusion on seclusion claim.27  
The right to be free from intrusion may also be waived.28  Consent and 
waiver may be implied or inferred from the surrounding circumstances.29  
Qualified privileges generally apply to invasion of privacy claims, but in 
at least one instance the Kansas Supreme Court found that a qualified 
privilege applicable to defamation claims did not apply to intrusion on 
seclusion because publication is not one of the tort’s elements.30 
The Kansas Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to articulate 
a clear approach to intrusion on seclusion claims in the employment 
context.  When it has this opportunity, it should balance the rights and 
interests of employees and employers to determine liability as it has in 
intrusion on seclusion claims in the collections context. 
III. THE RIGHT TO BE LEFT ALONE IS QUALIFIED BY THE RIGHTS OF 
OTHERS 
In the collections context, debtors’ privacy interests may be limited 
by creditors’ business interests.  When a debtor alleges a creditor 
intruded on her seclusion, Kansas courts explicitly balance the debtor’s 
rights against the rights of creditors.31  In this context, “the right to be left 
alone is qualified by the rights of others.”32  The Kansas Supreme Court 
                                                          
 27.  Entrikin, supra note 3, at 34; see also PIK CIVIL 4TH § 127.62 (2011); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A(1) (1979) (“One who effectively consents to conduct of another 
intended to invade his interests cannot recover in an action of tort for the conduct or for harm 
resulting from it.”).  Consent may more appropriately be considered part of the plaintiff’s case as 
opposed to consent being an affirmative defense the defendant must prove.  Consent prevents the 
conduct from constituting an actionable invasion.  See Entrikin, supra note 3, at 33–34. 
 28.  See Johnson, 262 P.2d at 814; see also Vespa v. Safety Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 P.2d 
878, 881 (Kan. 1976). 
 29. Johnson, 262 P.2d at 814; PIK CIVIL 4TH § 127.62; Entrikin, supra note 3, at 23, 35. 
 30.  Kansas courts have generally said that intentional tort privileges for communication torts 
(defamation, libel, slander) also apply to invasion of privacy claims.  See, e.g., Dominguez v. 
Davidson, 974 P.2d 112, 121 (Kan. 1999) (indicating privilege defenses apply to both defamation 
and invasion of privacy claims); see also Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publ’g Co., 543 P.2d 988 (Kan. 
1975).  However, the Adair court held that the privilege for communications made in judicial 
proceedings, which is applicable in defamation suits, did not apply to intrusion on seclusion.  
Froelich v. Adair, 516 P.2d 993, 997 (Kan. 1973).  The Adair court’s position “has been criticized as 
‘dubious’ and inconsistent with the consensus in other states that the set of qualified privileges 
applicable to defamation law generally applies to claims for invasion of privacy.”  Entrikin, supra 
note 3, at 36 n.165 (citing DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS § 2:13 (2002)). 
 31.  Moore v. R.Z. Sims Chevrolet-Subaru, Inc., 738 P.2d 852, 857–58 (Kan. 1987) (quoting 
Dawson v. Assocs. Fin. Servs., 529 P.2d 104, 110 (Kan. 1974)); see also Lowe v. Surpas Res. Corp., 
253 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1237 (D. Kan. 2002). 
 32.  Moore, 738 P.2d at 857 (quoting Dawson, 529 P.2d at 110). 
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first explained this idea in Dawson v. Associates Financial Services Co. 
of Kansas.33  Citing an Alabama Supreme Court decision, it stated: 
A creditor has and must have the right to take reasonable action to 
pursue his debtor and collect his debt.  But the right to pursue the 
debtor is not a license to outrage the debtor.  The problem of defining 
the scope of the right to privacy in the debtor-creditor situation is the 
problem of balancing the interest of the creditor in collecting his debt 
against that of the debtor in his own personality.34 
Thus, creditors are “given some latitude to pursue reasonable 
methods of collecting debts” even though the methods embarrass or 
inconvenience the debtor.35  By accepting credit, “the debtor impliedly 
consents for the creditor to take reasonable steps to pursue payment even 
though it may result in actual, though not actionable, invasion of 
privacy.”36  The creditor’s actions must be reasonable, and the debtor is 
protected only from oppressive and outrageous conduct.37 
Similarly, in the employment context, employers may have 
legitimate business reasons for actions that potentially invade an 
employee’s privacy.  Employers must have the right to protect their 
interests, but that right is not a license to outrage the employee.  As in the 
creditor–debtor cases, defining the scope of the right to privacy in an 
employer–employee case requires balancing the legitimate business 
interests of the employer against the privacy rights of the employee. 
IV. KANSAS EMPLOYER–EMPLOYEE CASES 
One federal district court in Kansas has relied on creditor–debtor 
parallels in the employer–employee context.  In Ali v. Douglas Cable 
Communications, the court explicitly balanced employee privacy 
interests against employer business interests when analyzing an 
employee intrusion on seclusion claim against an employer. 38 
In Ali, the plaintiffs were customer service representatives whose 
primary duties were handling customer phone calls about sales, 
complaints, and the collection of delinquent accounts.39  Douglas Cable 
                                                          
 33.  529 P.2d 104 (Kan. 1974). 
 34.  Id. at 110 (quoting Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 132 So. 2d 321, 323 (Ala. 1961)). 
 35.  Id. at 110. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  929 F. Supp. 1362, 1382 (D. Kan. 1996). 
 39.  Id. at 1372. 
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Communications (DCC) began extensively recording and monitoring 
their calls for training and supervision purposes.40  DCC notified 
employees about the monitoring, but DCC recorded the employees’ work 
and personal calls for a period of time before it notified them.41 Among 
other things, the employees claimed DCC’s actions intruded on their 
seclusion.42 
In ruling on the employer’s summary judgment motion, the court 
found that the monitoring of work-related phone calls was neither an 
intrusion into the plaintiffs’ zone of privacy nor highly offensive to a 
reasonable person.43  The monitoring of personal calls was, on the other 
hand, an actionable intrusion into their privacy.44  “Without 
uncontroverted proof that the plaintiffs knew their personal calls would 
be recorded,” the court could not find that their expectation that those 
calls would remain private was unreasonable as a matter of law.45  Thus, 
a reasonable jury could find the monitoring invaded their zone of 
privacy. 
The court then considered whether the employer’s actions were 
justified, which required a balancing test.  “The employer’s asserted 
interest in recording the phone calls ‘must be balanced against the degree 
of intrusion resulting from the employer’s methods to obtain the 
information.’”46  Ultimately the court found that a reasonable jury could 
conclude that DCC’s conduct in recording the employees’ personal calls 
was not justified.47 
Thus, the federal court in Ali analyzed the intrusion claim in two 
parts.  First, it determined whether the employees had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy or “zone of privacy” in their personal telephone 
calls.  Then it analyzed whether the employer’s business interest justified 
the degree of intrusion, leading to the ultimate question of whether a 
reasonable jury could find the intrusion was highly offensive to a 
reasonable person. 
                                                          
 40.  Id. at 1373. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. at 1381. 
 43.  Id. at 1382. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. at 1383 (quoting Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co., 882 F. Supp. 836, 837 (S.D. Iowa 1994), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 72 F.3d 648 (8th Cir. 1995)).  In support, the court also cited 
the balancing of interests in the creditor–debtor context under Kansas law.  Id. (citing Dawson v. 
Assocs. Fin. Servs. Co., 529 P.2d 104, 110 (Kan. 1974)). 
 47.  Id. 
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Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly balanced employer–
employee interests in intrusion on seclusion claims in the employment 
context.48  Some have done so specifically in the second part of the 
intrusion analysis, determining whether the alleged intrusion is highly 
offensive.49 
The approach is also similar to the privacy analysis for employee 
claims under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.50  
When a government employee claims a constitutional violation based on 
an employer’s intrusion into privacy for allegedly work-related purposes, 
courts first analyze whether the employee has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the information, matter, or place.51  Then, the government 
                                                          
 48.  A tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of Employment Law collects several intrusion 
on seclusion cases balancing the employer’s legitimate business interests against the employee’s 
privacy interest: 
Bratt v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 392 Mass. 508, 520, 467 N.E.2d 126, 135 (1984) (“In 
evaluating whether the information sought from employees could amount to an 
unreasonable interference with their right of privacy, we stated that the employer’s 
legitimate interest in determining the employees’ effectiveness in their jobs should be 
balanced against the seriousness of the intrusion on the employees’ privacy.”); Vargo v. 
Nat’l Exch. Carriers Ass’n, Inc., 870 A.2d 679, 686 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) 
(“[W]hether there is a common law violation requires a court to balance the employer’s 
interest with the prospective employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy.”); Borse v. 
Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 625 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[D]etermining whether an 
alleged invasion of privacy is substantial and highly offensive to the reasonable person 
necessitates the use of a balancing test.”) (applying Pa. law); Wilcher v. City of 
Wilmington, 60 F. Supp. 2d 298, 302 (D. Del. 1999) (“Delaware courts have repeatedly 
recognized that the right of privacy is not an absolute right, but a right that is qualified by 
the circumstances and the rights of others.”) (applying Del. law). 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.06 reporters’ notes cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 5, 
2012). 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  The expectations an employee has against government intrusion may be different than an 
employee’s expectations against private employer intrusions.  Similarly, a government employer’s 
business rights and interests may be different than those of a private employer.  The balancing 
approach, however, makes sense in both contexts.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT 
LAW § 7.01 reporters’ notes cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2012) (“The Supreme Court’s approach 
to employee privacy interests has a federal constitutional, rather than a common-law, basis.  
However, the Court’s analysis of the constitutional protections accorded to government workers has 
employed a balancing test that would appear equally appropriate in the common-law context.”). 
 51.  City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2628–29 (2010).  This test reflects most closely 
the plurality approach in O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).  The plurality suggested courts 
determine (1) whether a search implicates Fourth Amendment rights because the employee has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, and (2) whether the employer’s intrusion on that privacy is 
reasonable under the circumstances.  Id. at 717–19, 725–26 (plurality opinion).  To determine a 
Fourth Amendment violation in the employment context, Justice Scalia would determine whether a 
search would be “regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer context.”  Id. at 731–32 
(Scalia, J., concurring).  When using Justice Scalia’s approach to determine if a search would be 
regarded as reasonable and normal in the private employer context, courts have specifically 
examined whether the search would be an intrusion on seclusion under state tort law.  See, e.g., 
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employer’s intrusion on that expectation is “judged by the standard of 
reasonableness under all the circumstances.”52  The intrusion “is 
reasonable if it is justified at its inception and if the measures adopted are 
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively 
intrusive in light of the circumstances giving rise to the search.”53  Thus, 
courts balance the invasion of the employee’s reasonable expectations of 
privacy against the government employer’s “need for supervision, 
control, and the efficient operation of the workplace.”54  In both tort and 
Fourth Amendment analysis, therefore, the law recognizes that an 
employer’s legitimate business interests must justify intrusion on an 
employee’s privacy.55 
When analyzing intrusion on seclusion claims, Kansas courts should 
use the balancing approach of the Ali court and other state courts.  To 
determine an employer’s liability, the court should first determine if the 
employer intentionally intruded into the employee’s zone of privacy or a 
matter or information in which the employee had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  If so, the court should determine whether that 
intrusion was highly offensive by balancing the defendant’s legitimate 
business interest against the employee’s privacy interest.  This explicit 
two-step approach will allow for a clearer development of the law, which 
is especially important given the tort remains one of the few available 
privacy protections for employees of nongovernment employers. 
Even as to the first inquiry, determining whether an employee has a 
legally protectable privacy interest or zone of privacy, a defendant 
employer’s business interest may be relevant.56  Employers generally 
                                                                                                                       
 
Richards v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Carter v. Cnty. of 
Los Angeles, 770 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
 52.  Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630 (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 725–26 (plurality opinion)). 
 53.  Id. at 2630 (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 725–26) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 54. Thompson v. Johnson Cnty. Cmty. Coll., 930 F. Supp. 501, 508 (D. Kan. 1996) (quoting 
O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 719–20) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d, No. 96-3223, 1997 WL 
139760 (10th Cir. 1997), and aff’d sub nom. Boyer v. Johnson Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 108 
F.3d 1388 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 55.  The Kansas Supreme Court used a similar balancing of interests to determine if sheriffs 
were liable for intrusion on seclusion when they entered a plaintiff’s home without a warrant.  
Monroe v. Darr, 559 P.2d 322, 327 (Kan. 1977).  The court first found that entering plaintiff’s home 
was an intrusion on his privacy.  It then stated: “Such intrusion, unless justified by the 
circumstances, would constitute an actionable invasion of . . . privacy.”  Id. (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977); Froelich v. Adair, 516 P.2d 993 (Kan. 1973); Dotson v. 
McLaughlin, 531 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1975); Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Uninvited Entry into Another’s 
Living Quarters As Invasion of Privacy, 56 A.L.R.3D 434 (1974) and cases cited therein.). 
 56.  See, e.g., Ali v. Douglas Cable Commc’ns, 929 F. Supp. 1362, 1382 (D. Kan. 1996).  The 
court found that monitoring work-related phone calls was not a substantial intrusion on employees 
because of the employer’s interest in monitoring the calls: 
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own57 and control the workplace, and thus are to some level responsible 
for what occurs there.58  Employers must be able to maintain and control 
their property and monitor employees to ensure they perform their jobs 
in a satisfactory, efficient, and safe manner.59  Because of these interests, 
different expectations for privacy will exist in the workplace than in 
other contexts.60  Employer policies and business practices will also 
shape employees’ privacy expectations.61 
An explicit balancing of interests is necessary, however, to determine 
whether the intrusion is one that would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person.  An intrusion should not be highly offensive if the 
employer’s legitimate business need outweighs the employee’s privacy 
interest.  As the importance of the privacy interest and the intrusiveness 
of the employer’s actions increase, so too must the employer’s showing 
of a business need.62  The level of business interest must be sufficient to 
justify the invasion.63  Both the scope and manner of the employer’s 
                                                                                                                       
 
The plaintiffs cannot reasonably claim any offensive intrusion by the monitoring or 
recording of their business calls at the work place.  Such calls were made for the benefit 
and in the interest of their employer.  The business calls were a large part of the 
plaintiffs’ responsibilities at work, and the defendants were simply monitoring the 
plaintiffs’ work performance. 
Id. 
 57.  Ownership of an item is not dispositive, but it is an important consideration in determining 
privacy interests.  See, e.g., United States v. Angevine, 281 F.3d 1130, 1134–35 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(examining whether for Fourth Amendment purposes a professor had reasonable expectation of 
privacy in an office computer). 
 58.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.01 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 5, 
2012). 
 59.  See id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629–30 (2010) (noting that clearly 
communicated employer policies will shape employees’ reasonable expectations of privacy); see 
also Angevine, 281 F.3d at 1134 (“[E]mployees’ expectations of privacy . . . may be reduced by 
virtue of actual office practices and procedures . . . .” (quoting O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 
717 (1987))). 
 62.  Cf. Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185, 1187–88 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“The protections of 
the Fourth Amendment are graduated in proportion to the privacy interests affected.  Decreasing 
levels of intrusiveness require decreasing levels of justification.”). 
 63.  The tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of Employment Law outlines the scope of 
wrongful employer intrusions: 
Courts have focused on two aspects of the intrusion in judging its offensiveness: the 
purpose of the intrusion and the method of the intrusion.  A legitimate business purpose 
or public interest must justify the intrusion itself and its manner and scope.  In some 
cases, the strength of the business purpose or public interest will determine the 
reasonableness of the manner or scope of the intrusion; for example, an important interest 
will justify an invasive intrusion, whereas meager justification will not justify the same 
intrusion.  The inquiry is necessarily context-specific. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.06 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2012). 
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intrusion must be reasonable in light of the employee’s privacy interest.  
Even if the employer has a legitimate purpose for its intrusion, the means 
used must also be reasonable as balanced against the employee’s privacy 
interest.64 
Explicitly balancing the rights of employers and employees will 
ensure courts consider the degree to which an employer has a legitimate 
business need for the information when determining the extent to which 
an employee’s privacy right is qualified or limited.  That inquiry may be 
more complex than it is in the creditor–debtor context.  The creditor’s 
interest is simply to recover the debt; an employer will have a variety of 
business interests it needs to protect.65 
This balancing approach would appropriately be used to determine 
liability for alleged intrusions both on and off employer property.  
Determining liability gets more complex as employees leave the 
employer’s work site and work from home or other personal spaces (e.g., 
a friend’s home, a hotel room, or a personal vehicle).  As home and 
office life merge, employers can more easily argue for a business need to 
inquire into or monitor employee behavior away from the employer’s 
business site.66  This reality suggests employees need an explicit 
balancing of employer and employee interests to hold on to whatever 
privacy rights they currently have.  An employer must be required to 
justify the degree of its intrusion based on the importance or scope of its 
business interest, or any business interest could arguably justify an 
invasion of an employee’s private matters. 
This balancing approach would also appropriately be used to resolve 
claims involving employer monitoring of on-duty and off-duty conduct.67  
                                                          
 64.  This is consistent with Kansas intrusion on seclusion law outside the employment context.  
Both the nature and manner of the intrusion must be highly offensive to a reasonable person.  See 
Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., 262 P.2d 808, 809 (Kan. 1953); see also Moore v. R.Z. Sims 
Chevrolet-Subaru, Inc., 738 P.2d 852, 856 (Kan. 1987). 
 65.  An employer may want to monitor an employee for a variety of reasons.  An employer may 
want to monitor work activities for performance issues or to determine the most productive 
manufacturing method.  It might want to determine if employees are violating work rules or want to 
monitor certain physical areas to ensure employee and client safety.  It might want to monitor 
employee use of company equipment, including company vehicles, or determine if employees are 
using alcohol or illegal drugs.  It might monitor off duty behavior if it suspects an employee on 
medical leave or receiving workers’ compensation is not honestly representing her condition.  See 
O’Gorman, supra note 3, at 219–22.  Employers pursued many of these business interests in the 
cases included in the following survey.  See infra Part V.  But even when an employer’s business 
interest is legitimate, that interest must be balanced against the employee’s privacy interest to 
determine whether the employer’s intrusion is highly offensive and, thus, whether the employer has 
violated the employee’s common law right to privacy. 
 66.  See Sprague, supra note 1, at 33. 
 67.  See id. (examining the propriety of employers expanding surveillance beyond the 
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It would apply, for example, to an employer who investigated an 
employee’s off-duty behavior to determine the validity of the employee’s 
claim that she was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.  A court 
would first determine if the investigation invaded a private matter or 
private information and then determine whether the employer’s business 
need for the information justified the scope of the intrusion and the 
means used.  The balancing approach would also apply to resolve a claim 
based on an employer’s monitoring of an employee’s or prospective 
employee’s postings on social media sites or personal blogs.68  The 
analysis would first turn on whether the employee has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the online information.  If the employee could 
establish the information was private, the court would then balance the 
employee’s privacy interest against the employer’s legitimate business 
interest to determine if the employer intruded on the employee’s 
seclusion.69 
Courts should balance the parties’ respective interests as part of 
assessing whether a plaintiff has established the elements of the intrusion 
on seclusion tort (specifically in determining whether the employer’s 
actions were highly offensive to a reasonable person).  While an 
employer might also allege a legitimate business purpose in support of an 
affirmative defense or privilege, a court should balance employer and 
employee interests in the first instance as it considers the sufficiency of 
the plaintiff’s case.  This is consistent with Kansas courts’ analysis of the 
intrusion on seclusion tort in the creditor–debtor context, with the Ali 
court’s analysis, with the privacy analysis in the Fourth Amendment 
context, and with the suggested approach of the tentative draft of the 
Restatement (Third) of Employment Law.  Each approach examines the 
                                                                                                                       
 
workplace and noting that when courts have found employers to have at least potentially invaded an 
employee’s privacy, “it is usually because the employer has pried into an employee’s private life far 
beyond a legitimate business need”). 
 68.  See Patricia Sanchez Abril et al., Blurred Boundaries: Social Media Privacy and the 
Twenty-First-Century Employee, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 63, 108, 112, 123–24 (2012) (positing that 
Millennial employees maintain an expectation of privacy regarding information disclosed on social 
media, yet current law does not offer meaningful protections for employees’ social media privacy). 
 69.  Absent new statutory protections, this balancing approach may be the employee’s best 
chance to limit employer prying that does not relate to a legitimate business interest.  As to personal 
information on social media, Kansas employees may have some statutory protection in the near 
future.  As this Article was submitted for publication, Kansas lawmakers introduced legislation 
preventing employers from asking employees to divulge social media information.  The legislation 
would prohibit employers from requesting or requiring applicants or employees to disclose (1) 
whether they have a social media site or website, or (2) the password or other form of access to the 
site.  See H.B. 2092, 1-24, Kan. H.R., 2013 Sess. (Kan. 2013); S.B. 53, 1-18, Kan. Sen., 2013 Sess. 
(Kan. 2013). 
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reasonableness of the employer’s actions to determine whether a 
wrongful intrusion occurred. 
V. CASE SURVEY 
Federal district courts in Kansas have considered claims of employer 
intrusions into employees’ bodies, bodily functions, personal 
information, work areas, computer files, and telephone and electronic 
communications.  Thus far employers have fared well and prevailed on 
most claims.  Employees have, however, survived various dispositive 
motions when they have asserted a privacy interest in their bodies, 
medical information, personal phone calls, and personal computer files. 
Although some employers have tried to argue it, existing cases do 
not support the claim that employees have no zone of privacy in the 
workplace (the first part of the intrusion analysis).  Two federal courts 
have rejected employer claims that an employee can never have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the workplace under Kansas law,70 
although neither federal court could cite a specific Kansas case for this 
principle.  While it may be more difficult to establish a zone of privacy 
in matters, information, or property that employers and employees share, 
nothing in Kansas intrusion on seclusion law suggests an employee 
automatically loses all rights to privacy while working. 
Federal cases analyzing Kansas law make up the bulk of the 
following survey.  As mentioned, the Kansas Supreme Court has had 
little occasion to analyze an employee’s claim of intrusion on seclusion 
against an employer,71 but federal courts have repeatedly ruled on such 
claims under Kansas law.  The Kansas Supreme Court has looked to 
federal cases analyzing Kansas law for guidance in reaching decisions on 
                                                          
 70.  Topolski v. Chris Leef Gen. Agency Inc., No. 11-2495-JTM, 2012 WL 984278, at *3 (D. 
Kan. Mar. 22, 2012); Greenhorn v. Marriot Int’l, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1249,1261 (D. Kan. 2003). 
 71.  The Kansas Supreme Court has opined whether an employer would be liable for an 
intrusion on seclusion claim if it released certain employee personnel records.  An employer raised 
the issue as a defense to a discovery dispute in an employee’s discrimination claim against it.  The 
case is included in the survey.  See infra Part V.C.  The court also examined an employee’s privacy 
claim against an employer in Munsell v. Ideal Food Stores, 494 P.2d 1063 (Kan. 1972).  At the time, 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts recognized only one form of invasion of privacy.  See Entrikin 
supra note 3, at 37 n.172.  The jury instruction in Munsell referred to the “wrongful intrusion of 
one’s private activities,” which is the equivalent of intrusion on seclusion.  Munsell, 494 P.2d at 
1074.  The facts of the case, however, gave rise to a claim of false light publicity, and the court 
seemed to analyze this type of privacy claim and not intrusion on seclusion.  See id.  Insofar as the 
employee claimed his employer’s questions were an intrusion, the court seemed to find the questions 
were justified by a business purpose—determining if the employee falsified time records.  Entrikin, 
supra note 3, at 36–39. 
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other privacy tort claims, so it likely would do the same if faced with an 
intrusion on seclusion claim in the employment context.72 
Also included are a handful of Tenth Circuit and United States 
District Court of Kansas cases analyzing employees’ reasonable 
expectations of privacy under federal law.  To the extent these cases 
analyze employees’ reasonable expectations of privacy in the workplace, 
they may help predict the extent to which Kansas courts would find an 
intrusion into an employee’s private matters or information (the first part 
of the intrusion analysis).  Also, to the extent these cases balance 
government employer and employee interests, some parallels may be 
made to suggest an appropriate balance of interests in the private 
employer–employee context (the second part of the intrusion analysis).  
A few recent United States Supreme Court cases balancing the legitimate 
interests of government employers and employees and one United States 
Supreme Court case examining individuals’ reasonable expectations of 
privacy in the Fourth Amendment context as to the government’s use of 
GPS technology are also included.  The latter case is included for how it 
might bear on an employer’s analysis of whether its use of GPS 
technology could intrude on employee privacy. 
A. Bodies—Sexual Harassment and Sexual History 
Employees claiming sexual harassment have sometimes also sought 
to recover for intrusion on seclusion.  When the conduct consists of 
inappropriate touching or sexual comments, federal courts generally have 
dismissed the claims on the basis that the harassment is not a sufficient 
intrusion on the plaintiff’s solitude or prying into her private concerns.  
Courts seem to have struggled to determine whether the inappropriate 
conduct fit within the gravamen of the intrusion tort—whether the 
inappropriate conduct actually pried into or invaded a plaintiff’s private 
affairs.  They may have hesitated to expand the intrusion on seclusion 
tort to provide a remedy given that federal and state discrimination 
statutes already provide specific remedies for sexual harassment in the 
employment context.  One federal court did, however, conclude that 
inappropriate sexual conduct may be actionable as an intrusion on 
seclusion when the conduct involves coercive sexual demands. 
Occasional grabbing, touching, rubbing of shoulders, and sexual 
comments did not amount to an actionable intrusion into the solitude or 
                                                          
 72.  See, e.g., Dominguez v. Davidson, 974 P.2d 112, 121 (Kan. 1999) (quoting Ali v. Douglas 
Cable Commc’ns, 929 F. Supp. 1362, 1383 (D. Kan. 1996)). 
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seclusion of a plaintiff’s physical being in Haehn v. City of Hoisington.73  
These allegations were not “intrusive or coercive sexual demands” on 
plaintiff such that they examined her private concerns or improperly 
inquired “into her personal sexual proclivities and personality.”74  
Similarly, in Maus v. Belger Cartage Service, Inc., the court found 
repeated obscene gestures, messages, or jokes were not an invasion of 
privacy.75  The court noted the alleged harasser did not make “inquiries” 
into plaintiff’s sex life.76  In Maus, the plaintiff also alleged an instance 
of sexual battery, but the underlying facts of the battery do not appear in 
the opinion and, thus, it is unclear how severe or offensive the battery 
was.77  A manager’s single vulgar remark that an employee could “sit on 
[his] face” was also found not to be an intrusion into an employee’s 
sexual proclivities or privacy.78  Most recently, in Topolski v. Chris Leef 
General Agency Inc., a federal court again held that unwanted sexual 
advances and physical touches were insufficient to support an intrusion 
on seclusion claim.79 
It is possible, however, for the circumstances of a sexual harassment 
claim to suggest an actionable intrusion on seclusion.  In Greenhorn v. 
Marriott International, Inc., the federal court distinguished a 
supervisor’s actions as far more serious and invasive than those in Maus 
because the supervisor’s actions included coercive sexual demands of a 
highly offensive and intrusive nature.80  The court, therefore, refused to 
dismiss the plaintiff’s intrusion on seclusion claim against her 
                                                          
 73.  702 F. Supp. 1526, 1532 (D. Kan. 1988). 
 74.  Id. (quoting Phillips v. Smalley Maint. Servs., Inc., 711 F.2d 1524, 1536 (11th Cir. 1983)). 
 75.  No. 96-1257-JTM, 1996 WL 748056, at *3 (D. Kan. Dec. 27, 1996). 
 76.  Id.; cf. Pascouau v. Martin Marietta Corp., No. 98-1099, 1999 WL 495621, at *14 (10th 
Cir. July 14, 1999) (finding that coworkers bothering plaintiff with “inappropriate, prying questions 
about her sex life and sexual preferences” did not alone support a claim for intrusion on seclusion 
under Colorado law because, even if inappropriate or offensive, the questions revealed nothing and 
thus were not an invasion of privacy). 
 77.  Maus, 1999 WL 495621, at *1. 
 78.  Wolf v. Burum, No. 88-1233-C, 1990 WL 81219, at *11 (D. Kan. May 16, 1990). 
 79.  No. 11-2495-JTM, 2012 WL 984278, at *1, *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 22, 2012) (alleging 
supervisor touched plaintiff and forced her to listen to stories about his sexual exploits).  The rulings 
in these cases are consistent with the outcome of an earlier case, Ulrich v. K-Mart Corp., 858 F. 
Supp. 1087 (D. Kan. 1994), although the Ulrich court’s reasoning differs.  In Ulrich, the court 
dismissed a privacy claim at summary judgment even though an employee alleged her supervisor 
stroked, grabbed, kissed, and touched her on her breasts and between her legs.  Id. at 1090, 1095.  
Plaintiff did not allege the harasser made coercive sexual demands or exposed a private part of his 
body.  Id. at 1090.  The court did not analyze whether the alleged harasser had invaded plaintiff’s 
physical person, but rather found no intrusion on seclusion because the conduct occurred in a shared 
work area, not a private place.  Id. at 1095.  The more recent cases mentioned above shift the focus 
from whether a private place was invaded to whether the employee’s personal privacy was invaded. 
 80.  258 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1261–62 (D. Kan. 2003). 
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employer.81  The plaintiff alleged her supervisor sexually harassed her 
over an extended period of time.82  The supervisor’s actions included 
describing to plaintiff various sexual encounters in graphic detail and 
then touching plaintiff on her arms and neck; kissing plaintiff without her 
consent and then attempting to kiss her additional times; and exposing 
his erect penis to plaintiff and then telling her that if she valued her job 
she would perform oral sex on him.83  The court found the coercive 
sexual demands potentially pried into plaintiff’s private affairs or 
otherwise intruded on the solitude or seclusion of her physical being.84 
In Greenhorn, the court did not use a balancing test, but it was 
unnecessary in that case because the employer clearly had no legitimate 
business interest in that particular intrusion.  By contrast, a government 
employer argued it had a legitimate business reason for forcing an 
employee to disclose information about personal sexual matters in 
Eastwood v. Department of Corrections.85  A state corrections 
department questioned an employee about her sexual history after she 
alleged another employee had assaulted and molested her following a 
department training session.86  The Tenth Circuit rejected the 
department’s argument that its invasion of privacy was justified because 
the questions were designed to test the validity of the employee’s 
complaint.87  The court reasoned that little correlation exists between a 
plaintiff’s sexual history and whether she fabricated her claim that she 
was molested; therefore, the court refused to sanction this kind of 
questioning.88 
B. Bodily Functions—Drug Testing Cases 
Drug testing does not automatically violate an employee’s privacy 
rights, but it does have the potential to do so because it necessarily 
invades the employee’s private affairs—her bodily functions or bodily 
                                                          
 81.  Id. at 1262. 
 82.  Id. at 1253. 
 83.  Id. at 1252–53. 
 84.  Id. at 1261–62; cf. Daponte v. Ocean State Job Lot, No. WC-02-0646, 2009 WL 3328478 
(R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 2009)’ (finding that assault claims and privacy claims do not equate and that 
nonconsensual touching at the workplace, even if an assault, does not always amount to an invasion 
of privacy, especially where touching occurred in public location), aff’d, 21 A.3d 248 (R.I. 2011). 
 85.  846 F.2d 627, 630 (10th Cir. 1988) (arguing that the “State may legitimately inquire into 
the sexual conduct of its citizens . . . to determine if a claim of sexual harassment is well-founded”). 
 86.  Id. at 629. 
 87.  Id. at 631. 
 88.  Id. 
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fluids.89  Federal courts have upheld private employer drug testing and 
rejected claims that a drug test, or the means used to drug test, intruded 
on employees’ seclusion.  In at least two Tenth Circuit cases, however, 
drug tests were found to violate the Fourth Amendment. 
A federal district court found no invasion of privacy when an 
employer, consistent with a written policy, required an employee to 
provide a urine sample for a drug test to detect marijuana use.90  In Frye 
v. IBP, Inc., a meat processing plant had a policy stating that when 
employees have illegal drugs present in their system, “they become a 
safety hazard to themselves and their fellow employees.”91  In light of 
this policy, and the employer’s objective to provide a “safe, clean and 
wholesome place to work,”92 the employer was reasonable in seeking a 
drug test to determine whether its lead mechanic was smoking 
marijuana.93 
In another case, a nurse challenged not the drug test itself, but the 
manner in which the employer conducted it.94  The nurse consented to 
random drug testing as a condition of continued employment after her 
employer caught her under the influence of Demerol she stole from the 
hospital.95  She claimed the manner of testing invaded her privacy 
because her female supervisor observed her collecting her urine samples 
in a bathroom off a public hallway.  The bathroom had only one toilet, 
but the supervisor would enter and remain in the bathroom with the 
nurse.  The supervisor would crouch in front of or beside the nurse while 
she collected the sample, but she did not actually view the nurse’s urine 
entering the specimen cup.96  The court found no invasion of privacy in 
either the hospital’s purpose for obtaining the private information or the 
means the hospital used.97  The hospital’s purpose—preventing falsified 
tests—was proper, especially because the nurse did not challenge that 
                                                          
 89.  See Haire v. Peterson, No. 12CV6965, 2012 WL 6656912 (D. Kan. Dec. 21, 2012) 
(acknowledging drug testing creates the potential for an invasion of privacy because it necessarily 
delves into a person’s private affairs); Frye v. IBP, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1041 (D. Kan. 1998) 
(suggesting employers are not prohibited from conducting drug tests under Kansas law because 
section 44-706(b) of the Kansas Statutes, dealing with employee rights to unemployment benefits, 
allows employers to require drug testing as a condition of employment). 
 90.  Frye, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1042. 
 91.  Id. at 1036. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 1042. 
 94.  Jones v. HCA Health Servs. of Kan. Inc., No. 94-1412-JTM, 1998 WL 159505, at *16 (D. 
Kan. Mar. 9, 1998). 
 95.  Id. at *1, *4. 
 96.  Id. at *4. 
 97.  Id. at *16. 
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she consented to observed, random drug testing as a condition of 
employment.98  The court also found that even though the situation was 
uncomfortable and embarrassing, a reasonable person would not strongly 
object to the means the hospital used to acquire the information, and the 
hospital’s actions were not so far out of the ordinary as to be 
actionable.99 
In the Fourth Amendment context, the Tenth Circuit found that an 
employer’s business interest did not justify a random drug test of a city 
truck driver when he had no advance warning that he would or could be 
subject to the test.100  The court stated that “[t]his sort of unwarned 
testing is the most intrusive possible, contravening all of one’s 
reasonable expectations of privacy.”101  The city’s business interest in the 
information was diminished because the driver was not a new employee 
whose work habits were unknown.102  Rather, the driver had worked for 
more than a decade with no signs of drug or alcohol abuse, and the 
employee had been on leave for a year, so the test would not have 
revealed whether the employee was impaired on the job.103  Thus, the 
city’s diminished interest had to give way to the driver’s expectation of 
privacy.104 
The Tenth Circuit later struck a city drug testing policy that sought to 
randomly test mechanics working on city trash trucks.105  Following the 
United States Supreme Court decision in Chandler v. Miller,106 the Tenth 
Circuit held that although the city had a legitimate interest in ensuring 
workplace and public safety, it had shown no special need to drug test its 
mechanics.107  The city did not have evidence of a drug problem among 
its mechanics, or that drug use caused accidents or raised other safety 
concerns in its trash department.108  Moreover, the city’s policy was not 
designed to effectively detect or deter drug use because it was 
administered at predictable intervals—every four years when an 
employee renewed her commercial driver’s license—and gave 
                                                          
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Rutherford v. City of Albuquerque, 77 F.3d 1258, 1262–63 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 101.  Id. at 1262. 
 102.  Id. at 1262–63. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. at 1263. 
 105.  19 Solid Waste Dep’t Mechs. v. City of Albuquerque, 156 F.3d 1068, 1071, 1074 (10th 
Cir. 1998). 
 106.  520 U.S. 305 (1997). 
 107.  19 Solid Waste Dep’t Mechs., 156 F.3d at 1074. 
 108.  Id. 
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employees sufficient advance notice for them to avoid using drugs before 
the test.109  The city’s daily scrutiny of the mechanics’ work would serve 
as a better deterrent than its drug testing policy.110  Absent a special need 
for this type of suspicionless drug testing, the court found the testing 
violated the Fourth Amendment.111 
C. Personal Information—Personnel Records, Time Sheets, Medical 
Information, Investigations, and Background Checks 
In general, employees do not have an actionable privacy interest in 
information an employer gathers and maintains in personnel records, 
insofar as that information directly relates to the employer’s management 
of the workplace or is otherwise available as public information.  Courts 
have, however, acknowledged an employee privacy interest in more 
sensitive information such as medical records.  In some cases, courts 
have intuitively, if not explicitly, balanced the employee’s privacy 
interest against the employer’s business need for the information.  For 
example, an employer’s unjustified pursuit of medical information did 
support an employee’s intrusion on seclusion claim against that 
employer.  By contrast, an employer’s reasonable investigation of 
complaints that an employee’s alcohol use was affecting his work was 
not an intrusion on seclusion.  Explicitly balancing employer and 
employee interests in a privacy claim grounded in the United States 
Constitution, the United States Supreme Court concluded that even if a 
government employee has a privacy interest in certain personal 
information acquired in a background check, inquiries about recent drug 
use, financial integrity, abuse of alcohol or drugs, mental or emotional 
stability, and general behavior and conduct are lawful. 
1. Personnel Records 
As to publicly recorded facts—such as arrest and conviction 
records—contained in an employer’s files, an employee likely has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  The Kansas Supreme Court had 
occasion to consider the privacy an employee might reasonably expect in 
her personnel records in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. 
Lopez.112  In Lopez, an applicant filed a discrimination complaint with 
                                                          
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 1074–75. 
 112.  531 P.2d 455 (Kan. 1975). 
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the Kansas Commission on Civil Rights after the railway denied him 
employment.113  The Commission then sought the arrest and conviction 
records of all employees hired into a particular classification over a year 
to determine the employer’s typical use of this information.114  One of 
the railway’s arguments against the subpoena was that it would subject 
itself to liability for an invasion of privacy tort if it produced the 
records.115  The Kansas Supreme Court rejected the argument because it 
found the information sought was public and not private.116  It reasoned 
that arrests are frequently made in public and publicized in the news 
media, and that court records, with only limited exceptions, are generally 
open to the public to view.117  Because the facts disclosed were not 
private,118 no liability for invasion of privacy would result if the 
employer provided the information to the commission.119 
Employees similarly do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in their time sheets.  The Tenth Circuit addressed this issue in the Fourth 
Amendment context in McCarty v. City of Bartlesville.120  The city fired 
two police officers it believed had falsified time records.  In the course of 
the employment investigation and a subsequent criminal investigation, 
other police officers viewed the plaintiffs’ time sheets.121  After a 
criminal prosecution of the officers failed, the city rehired them, but the 
officers then sued for various alleged constitutional violations including 
a privacy violation.122  The privacy claim was dismissed.  The court 
found the employees had no objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their time sheets because they did not own the documents, the 
                                                          
 113.  Id. at 460. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 469. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Given their duties owed to the public, public officials may expect even less privacy in their 
employment records than their counterparts in the private sector.  See Wisconsin Newspress, Inc. v. 
Sch. Dist., 546 N.W.2d 143, 150 (Wis. 1996) (“[A] prominent public official, or official in a position 
of authority, should have a lower expectation of privacy regarding his or her employment records.”). 
 119.  Lopez, 531 P.2d at 470.  This is similar to the Kansas Court of Appeals’ finding in Robison 
v. Board of County Commissioners, that an individual has “at best only a limited privacy interest in 
his criminal history record at the [Kansas Bureau of Investigation] central depository.”  No. 93,992, 
2007 WL 518829, at *7 (Kan. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2007).  The court further found that because 
criminal charges are public information, discovery and disclosure of information contained in those 
records does not amount to an intrusion on seclusion.  Id. 
 120.  8 F. App’x 867 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 121.  Id. at 870–72. 
 122.  Id. at 872. 
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documents were not in their control, and they did not take—nor could 
they take—steps to maintain privacy in the time sheets.123 
2. Medical Records 
The sensitive nature of medical records distinguishes them from the 
personnel records discussed above.  Courts have acknowledged that 
medical information is generally private, but an employer can seek 
medical information that directly relates to an employee’s job.  When an 
employer can justify the need for the medical information and has 
employed reasonable means to gather it, it can likely successfully defend 
an intrusion on seclusion claim.  For example, medical records providing 
information only about the injuries causing plaintiff to miss work were 
not sufficiently confidential to support a privacy claim under the Fourth 
Amendment in Ortlieb v. Howery.124  The employee, a medical 
technologist at a city hospital, severely fractured her leg on an outing 
with other hospital employees.  She was initially taken to the same city 
hospital, and a number of doctors and fellow employees treated her 
there.125  When the employee later requested an indefinite extension of 
leave to recover from her injuries, her supervisor—one of the hospital 
doctors—retrieved her x-rays and viewed them without her 
permission.126  Based on his review of the x-rays and his understanding 
of her condition, the supervisor determined plaintiff would never be able 
to fully perform her job duties, so he denied the leave and terminated her 
employment.127  The court found that the employee did not have an 
absolute right to privacy in her x-rays.128  The information that the 
employee had a severely broken leg was well known by hospital 
employees, and because she supported her request for leave with a 
doctor’s report stating her continuing disability was corroborated by the 
x-rays, she had no reasonable expectation of privacy in them.129  Also, 
unlike written medical records, the x-rays contained no intimate or 
personal information that would support a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.130 
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On the other hand, an employer may invade an employee’s privacy 
when it gathers an employee’s medical information absent a legitimate 
business need for it.  In Lankford v. City of Hobart,131 the Tenth Circuit 
found a reasonable jury could conclude the city violated an employee’s 
privacy under federal law when she produced evidence the city police 
chief seized and reviewed her private medical records.132  The employee 
alleged the police chief sexually harassed her, and that when she rebuffed 
his advances he retaliated by, among other things, spreading rumors she 
was a lesbian.133  The plaintiff also alleged the police chief “used his 
authority as chief of police to obtain [her] private medical records 
without her consent from a local hospital in an attempt to discredit her or 
to prove his statements that she was a lesbian.”134  Citing various federal 
cases, the Tenth Circuit found “no question that an employee’s medical 
records, which may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well 
within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy protection.”135 
An employer may violate an employee’s rights if the means it uses to 
gather the employee’s medical information is unreasonable.  Thus, an 
employee’s allegation that her employer “badger[ed] and harass[ed]” the 
employee’s physician for medical information while the employee was 
on leave was sufficient to state a claim of intrusion on seclusion.136  In 
Blackwell v. Harris Chemical North America, Inc., the plaintiff 
employee suffered a serious medical condition that prevented her from 
working.137  She requested, and her employer granted, a leave of absence 
under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993.138  She alleged that 
while she was on leave, her employer harassed and badgered a nurse at 
her physician’s office for confidential information regarding her illness 
and treatment.139  While the court found the employer’s alleged conduct 
was not sufficiently outrageous to support a claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, it found the alleged conduct was 
sufficiently offensive to support an intrusion on seclusion claim.140  In 
                                                          
 131.  27 F.3d 477 (10th Cir. 1994). 
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 139.  Blackwell, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1305. 
 140.  Id. at 1309–10. 
1006 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
refusing to dismiss plaintiff’s claim, the court apparently found the 
medical information was private, and that, if proved, the employer’s 
conduct could be highly offensive, but it did not explain why in detail.  
The employer may have had no legitimate business interest in the 
medical information it sought or its business interest may not have 
justified its actions (or both).141 
3. Employer Investigations and Background Checks 
Courts seem to intuitively, if not explicitly, balance the rights of 
employers and employees to determine whether an employer’s 
investigation of employee behavior intrudes on the employee’s seclusion.  
In Curtwright v. Ray,142 the federal district court found a company’s 
investigation into the extent to which its president’s alcohol use was 
affecting his performance was not an intrusion on his seclusion.143  The 
company’s board of directors were informed that salesmen had 
complained about problems related to the president’s drinking, and some 
requested he not come into their territory because of it.144  The board 
investigated the complaints by interviewing particular company 
employees by telephone and then terminated the president.145  The court 
found the president agreed to the investigation and so had opened his 
affairs up to inspection.146  He therefore did not “cloak” his affairs to 
keep them private, and so the court found no intrusion.147  Although it 
did not say so explicitly, the court seemed influenced by the company’s 
legitimate business need to determine and control plaintiff’s work 
performance. 
The United States Supreme Court, in NASA v. Nelson,148 upheld the 
government’s right as an employer to conduct employee background 
checks that inquire about recent drug use, financial integrity, abuse of 
alcohol or drugs, mental or emotional stability, general behavior and 
conduct, and other matters.149  The plaintiffs were NASA contract 
                                                          
 141.  See id. 
 142.  No. 90-2034-V, 1991 WL 179385 (D. Kan. 1991). 
 143.  Id. at *7. 
 144.  Id. at *3. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at *7. 
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 148.  131 S. Ct. 746 (2011). 
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employees, many of whom worked for the agency for many years.150  
They objected to the government’s new requirement that contract 
employees undergo the same background check as the NASA civil 
servants.151  That background check required them to fill out a form 
asking, among other things, whether the employee has “used, possessed, 
supplied, or manufactured illegal drugs in the last year.”152  If an 
employee answered yes, she had to provide additional detail, including 
whether she received treatment or counseling.153  The employee also had 
to sign a release authorizing the government to obtain personal 
information from schools, employers, and others during its 
investigation.154  The government sent a questionnaire to references 
asking open-ended questions including whether the reference had 
adverse information about the employee’s honesty or trustworthiness, 
violations of the law, financial integrity, abuse of alcohol or drugs, 
mental or emotional stability, general behavior or conduct, and other 
matters.155  Once received by the government, the information acquired 
would be subject to the federal Privacy Act.156  The Act prohibits, subject 
to exceptions, the government from disclosing the information without 
the employee’s written consent.157 
The employees did not challenge the background check as an 
impermissible search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, but rather 
contended the check violated a “constitutional right to informational 
privacy.”158  The Court declined to determine whether a constitutional 
right to informational privacy exists.  Instead, it assumed the challenged 
inquiries into the employees’ personal information implicated “a privacy 
interest of constitutional significance.”159  It then held that, “whatever the 
scope of this interest,” the government could lawfully conduct these 
background checks given that the information revealed was “subject to 
the Privacy Act’s safeguards against public disclosure.”160 
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The Court reasoned that the government had a legitimate interest in 
conducting basic employment background checks because the 
investigations help ensure the security of government facilities and the 
employment of a competent, reliable workforce.161  The employees 
perform important work, “funded with a multibillion dollar investment 
from the American taxpayer,” so the government has a strong interest in 
understanding more about the contract employees who are “minding the 
store.”162  The Court found the questions about drug use on the employee 
form to be reasonable because “the Government is entitled to have its 
projects staffed by reliable, law-abiding persons who will ‘efficiently and 
effectively’ discharge their duties.”163  And it found the more open-ended 
questions to references “reasonably aimed at identifying capable 
employees who will faithfully conduct the Government’s business.”164  
The open-endedness of the questions also allowed the government to 
separate “strong candidates from weak ones.”165 
D. Work Areas—Locker Areas 
Analyzing employee claims under the Fourth Amendment, a federal 
district court held that security personnel did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in an unlocked, unenclosed locker area to which 
numerous employees had access.166  The area was located in a room that 
also housed the building’s heating and cooling equipment, and few 
people other than the security officers routinely entered the room.167  The 
court found the employer, a community college, acted reasonably when it 
videotaped (without sound) the locker area to investigate reports of theft 
and of employees improperly bringing firearms to work.168 
Also analyzing an employee claim under the Fourth Amendment, the 
Tenth Circuit found that, even if an employee has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a locker, a government employer may search 
the locker if it has legitimate grounds to believe the employee stole 
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employer property and placed it there.169  The court balanced the 
employee’s legitimate privacy interest in her locker against the 
government employer’s interest in completing work promptly and 
efficiently, and it concluded the search was proper.170 
E. Computer Files 
A few federal cases address the extent to which employees have a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in work computers under federal 
constitutional law.  In one case, the Tenth Circuit found an employee had 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in an employer-owned computer, 
and in another it found an employee had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a personal computer the employee brought to work.  A federal 
district court, however, found that an employee may have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in personal files on a work computer.  Employer 
policies and actual workplace practices weighed heavily in the privacy 
interest analysis in each case.  Employers who notified employees they 
would monitor and access computer data files, and then instituted 
workplace practices consistent with those policies, did in fact limit or 
eliminate their employees’ privacy interest.  But an employer who 
allowed employees to have personal files on their work computers, and 
who did not actually monitor those computers, left open the possibility 
that its employees had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
personal computer files. 
The Tenth Circuit rejected an employee’s claim he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in an office computer in United States v. Angevine 
City.171  The employee tried to hide that he viewed over 3,000 images of 
child pornography.172  His employer, Oklahoma State University, had a 
very specific computer policy aimed at reducing or eliminating any 
employee privacy interest in office computer data.173  The policy stated 
the university (1) had the right to view any file stored or passing through 
the computer; (2) would in fact periodically monitor data; (3) kept logs 
of erased data and could determine who erased it; and (4) would monitor 
and access employee computer data and stored files if it suspected 
wrongdoing.174  The university’s ownership of the equipment, the lack of 
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immediate control the employee had of his data, and the employee’s 
failure to take any steps to maintain privacy in his computer all 
contributed to the court’s finding that the employee had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his computer data.175 
The Tenth Circuit also approved a warrantless search of an 
employee’s personal computer that he brought to work and connected to 
the government employer’s computer network.  In United States v. 
Barrows a county treasurer shared a workspace with the county clerk in 
an open area of city hall.176  To avoid having to share a computer with 
the clerk, the treasurer brought in his home computer and connected it to 
the county computer network.177  Shortly after, the clerk had trouble 
accessing files on his computer and suspected the treasurer’s computer 
might be causing the problem.178  With another person’s assistance, the 
clerk searched the treasurer’s computer to find the source of the 
computer problems and in doing so he found files containing child 
pornography.179  In denying the treasurer’s motion to suppress in the 
criminal case against him, the Tenth Circuit found the treasurer had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the computer even though he owned 
it and not all files on it were accessible to others.180  Because he 
voluntarily brought it to a public space and took no steps to limit others’ 
access to the computer—by password protecting it or shutting it off—his 
subjective expectation of privacy was unreasonable.181 
In contrast, in Haynes v. Office of the Attorney General Phill Kline, 
the federal district court found an employee may have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in certain personal files on a work computer.182  
The court considered the issue on a motion for preliminary injunction, so 
it did not make a finding on the merits.183  The court did, however, 
conclude that the question was substantial and a fair ground for litigation 
even though the employee was aware of the government’s written policy 
that employees “shall [have] no expectation of privacy in using [the 
computer] system.”184  The following facts were sufficient to raise 
                                                          
 175.  Id. at 1134–35. 
 176.  481 F.3d 1246, 1247 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Id. at 1248–49. 
 181.  Id. at 1249. 
 182.  298 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1161–62 (D. Kan. 2003). 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. at 1162. 
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serious issues whether the employee reasonably expected privacy in 
some personal files: employees were permitted to make private 
communications using their work computers; employees were taught to 
create “public” and “private” files; employees were advised they were 
prohibited from accessing another employee’s email; and the government 
submitted no evidence it had ever monitored or viewed employees’ 
private files or emails.185 
F. Telephone and Electronic Communications 
An employer does not intrude on another’s seclusion simply by 
listening to an unlawfully acquired audiotape of a private conversation, 
but it may intrude on an employee’s seclusion by taping personal phone 
calls without the employee’s knowledge if it does not discourage the 
employee from making personal calls on the employer’s phone system.186 
An employer does not intrude on another’s seclusion simply by 
listening to an unlawfully acquired audiotape of a private conversation.  
In Fields v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Railway Co., an employer 
received in the mail a letter and a tape of private conversations between 
one of its managers and another employee.187  The letter alleged the two 
employees were having an affair.188  The employer did not know who 
recorded or sent the tape, nor did the employer record employee 
conversations on its phones.189  The employer played the tape in front of 
the manager, confirmed it was his voice on the tape, and then fired the 
manager.190  The court rejected the manager’s argument that the 
employer invaded his privacy by listening to the tapes after knowing they 
were surreptitiously taped without consent.191  Listening, alone, was not 
an intrusion absent evidence the employer authorized or was otherwise 
involved in the original taping.192 
As already mentioned, the federal district court in Ali found that 
employees could reasonably expect privacy in their personal phone calls, 
                                                          
 185.  Id.; see also People v. Wilkinson, 859 N.Y.S.2d 356, 361 (N.Y. Onondaga Cnty. Ct. May 
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even when those calls were made on an employer-owned phone.193  An 
employer’s monitoring of those personal phone calls on work time could 
also be highly offensive to a reasonable person.194  In Ali, the employer 
did not discourage employees from making personal calls and did not 
notify the employees of the monitoring.  The court upheld the monitoring 
of work-related calls but not the monitoring of personal phone calls.195  
While the employer could justify the former, it could not justify the 
latter. 
G. Text Messages 
The United States Supreme Court held in City of Ontario v. Quon 
that a city did not violate its employee’s Fourth Amendment rights when 
it reviewed his personal text messages on a city-provided pager without a 
warrant.196 
The city purchased pagers capable of sending and receiving text 
messages and gave them to members of its SWAT team, including 
plaintiff Quon.197  Under the service contract for the pagers, each pager 
was allotted a limited number of characters to be sent or received each 
month.  If an employee used more characters, the city had to pay an 
additional fee.198  Before acquiring the pagers, the city issued a policy 
stating that it “reserves the right to monitor and log all network activity 
including e-mail and Internet use, with or without notice.  Users should 
have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these 
resources.”199  Although the policy did not specifically apply to the 
pagers, Quon’s supervisor informed him and other employees that the 
policy would apply.200 
Quon and several other officers repeatedly exceeded the monthly 
character allotment.201  For several months, the city allowed employees 
to reimburse the city for the overages rather than audit the employees’ 
texts.  Eventually, however, the city audited employee text message 
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use.202  It contacted the service provider and received transcripts of text 
messages that Quon and others sent over a two-month period.203  
Investigators used Quon’s work schedule to redact the messages sent 
while off-duty.204  A review of his work-time texts revealed numerous 
non-work-related texts and some sexually explicit content.205  Quon was 
apparently disciplined for his conduct.206 
The United States Supreme Court did not decide whether Quon had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages.  That inquiry was 
unnecessary because, even if Quon had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his personal texts, the city’s warrantless review of the pager 
transcript was reasonable because it was motivated by a legitimate work-
related purpose and its scope was not excessive.207  The city had a 
legitimate interest in (1) determining whether the existing character limit 
was sufficient and (2) ensuring it did not force employees to pay out of 
their own pockets for work-related expenses.208  The city had reasonable 
grounds for suspecting the audit was needed for these work-related 
purposes, and the means it used were not excessively intrusive (because 
of the limited time frame and the use of redacted transcripts).209  The 
Court also found that because the city had a legitimate reason for the 
search, and it was not excessively intrusive, the search would be 
“regarded as reasonable and normal in the private employer context.”210 
In declining to determine whether Quon had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his text messages under the circumstances of his case, the 
Court noted the difficulty of predicting how technology will shape 
employees’ privacy expectations and the “degree to which society will be 
prepared to recognize those expectations as reasonable.”211  It noted that, 
on the one hand, the pervasiveness of cell phone and text message 
communications may strengthen the case for an expectation of privacy.  
“On the other hand, the ubiquity of those devices has made them 
generally affordable, so one could counter that employees who need cell 
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phones or similar devices for personal matters can purchase and pay for 
their own.”212  The Court further confirmed that employer policies 
concerning communications will shape employees’ reasonable 
expectations, “especially to the extent that such policies are clearly 
communicated.”213 
H. GPS Tracking 
Employers are increasingly using GPS technology to keep track of 
employees and equipment.214  Although courts have upheld the use of 
this technology to track employees in employer-owned vehicles, privacy 
issues may still arise when an employee uses the vehicle for work and 
private purposes and the employer continues to track the vehicle on the 
employee’s personal time. 
A federal district court ruled that an employer’s GPS monitoring of 
an employee in a company-owned vehicle on the employee’s personal 
time did not intrude on the employee’s seclusion.215  In reaching its 
decision, the district court relied in part on Fourth Amendment case law 
upholding the propriety of government use of beeper-assisted 
surveillance in the criminal law context.216  Since this district court 
ruling, however, the United States Supreme Court has specifically 
addressed whether the government’s use of GPS monitoring violates the 
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches.  In 
United States v. Jones, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
government’s attachment of a GPS tracking device to a person’s vehicle, 
for the purpose of obtaining information about the person, is a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.217 
In Jones, the Court found the government searched defendant’s 
property because, by placing the GPS receiver on the defendant’s vehicle 
and tracking it, it “physically occupied private property for the purpose 
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of obtaining information.”218  It noted, however, that its decision did not 
alter precedent establishing that the government’s mere visual 
observation of a vehicle on public roads is not a search, as a “person 
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”219  
The majority opinion did not reach the question of whether “achieving 
the same result through electronic means [such as longer term monitoring 
with GPS], without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional 
invasion of privacy.”220 
Five Justices in two concurring opinions did opine, however, that 
“longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses 
impinges on expectations of privacy.”221  These Justices took the 
attributes of GPS monitoring into account when considering a societal 
expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s public movements.222  “GPS 
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s 
public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, 
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”223  Justice 
Sotomayor further opined: 
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily 
disclosed to third parties.  This approach is ill suited to the digital age, 
in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to 
third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.224 
An explicit balancing of interests under the approach outlined in Part 
III would assist a court analyzing whether an employer intrudes on an 
employee’s seclusion if it surreptitiously monitors employees using GPS.  
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Consider an employer that allows an employee to use an employer-
owned vehicle on work and personal time.  What if the employer 
investigates suspected wrongdoing by tracking the employee with GPS?  
Assume the employer did not notify the employee of the monitoring 
because it would undermine the investigation.  Would it be an intrusion 
on seclusion if the employer tracked the employee on work and personal 
time?  Under the approach in Part III, a court would first determine 
whether an employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy or zone of 
privacy in the sum of her movements in an employer-owned vehicle on 
public roads.  It would be difficult for the employee to claim a reasonable 
expectation of privacy while on company business, but it might be 
possible to establish a zone of privacy around the sum of one’s 
movements on public roads while off duty (the employee would have to 
distinguish observing a person on a public street from the comprehensive 
record GPS monitoring can produce).  If a court found the sum of the 
employee’s movements on public roads while off-duty to be a private 
matter, the court would next determine whether the GPS monitoring was 
highly offensive to a reasonable person by balancing the employer’s 
business need for the information against the employee’s privacy 
interest.  Whether the GPS monitoring was an actionable invasion would 
be highly dependent on the specific facts. 
I. Thwarting Commission of the Tort 
If an employee refuses to permit the employer’s intrusion, she may 
not recover for intrusion on seclusion even if the employee’s refusal 
resulted in discipline.  In Gretencord v. Ford Motor Co., the federal 
District of Kansas refused to allow a Ford employee to recover for an 
invasion that never took place. 225  Ford had a policy requiring employees 
to submit to random vehicle searches when exiting company lots.226  
Failure to submit would result in lost parking privileges and discipline.227  
Ford security officers subsequently tried to stop plaintiff’s vehicle; 
plaintiff refused to submit to the stop and never submitted to a search.228  
Ford then took away his parking privileges and a portion of his pay.229  
The court did not opine on the propriety of the discipline, but found 
                                                          
 225.  538 F. Supp. 331, 333 (D. Kan. 1982). 
 226.  Id. at 332. 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  Id. 
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plaintiff had thwarted the commission of a tort and, therefore, he could 
not recover for damages that never occurred.230 
J. Consent 
As mentioned, consent is a complete defense to intrusion upon 
seclusion, and it may be inferred from the circumstances.  But whether 
and to what extent an employee has consented to an intrusion on 
seclusion can be difficult to discern. 231  An employee does not consent to 
every intrusion simply by accepting employment.  On the other hand, a 
court may infer consent even if an employee acceded to the employer’s 
demands because she faced discipline.  Exploring consent in the 
employment context requires a separate article; the following paragraphs 
simply summarize two Kansas cases on the subject.232 
When an employee consents to an employer’s investigation of her 
conduct, no actionable invasion occurs when the employer interviews 
employees and otherwise seeks information within the parameters of the 
                                                          
 230.  Id. at 333; cf. Pascouau v. Martin Marietta Corp., No. 98-1099, 1999 WL 495621, at *14 
(10th Cir. July 14, 1999) (noting under Colorado law, liability attaches only to unconsented 
invasions “that actually glean private information”). 
 231.  Courts have considered whether an employee consented to an invasion in other types of 
privacy tort claims.  For example, in Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., an employee objected to 
Boeing’s unauthorized publication of his picture in company promotional materials and published 
advertisements.  262 P.2d 808, 809 (Kan. 1953).  The court found the employee impliedly consented 
to his photograph being used while he was employed.  Id. 813–14.  The outcome was just the 
opposite, however, in a remarkably similar case against Boeing almost fifty years later.  In Dry v. 
Boeing, Boeing again used a picture of an employee in promotional and advertising materials 
without the employee’s authorization.  No. 99-1402-WEB, 2002 WL 31730924, at *1 (D. Kan. Sept. 
3, 2002).  In Dry, however, Boeing continued to use the employee’s photograph even after it fired 
the employee.  Id.  The court found this fact distinguished it from Johnson and would not imply, as a 
matter of law, the employee’s consent to use the photograph once the employee no longer worked 
for Boeing.  Id. at *3.  The “less than friendly” circumstances of the employee’s termination raised a 
genuine issue of fact whether consent was limited to the employment term or whether a reasonable 
employer would understand the employee’s prior consent was limited or revoked.  Id. 
 232.  The tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of Employment Law takes the position that 
employee consent obtained as a condition of obtaining or retaining employment is “not sufficient to 
provide a defense” to an intrusion on seclusion claim.  See § 7.06 cmt. g.  This position would 
appear to conflict with federal cases applying Kansas law, as they have found consent even when an 
employee was faced with a Hobson’s choice of either consenting to the intrusion or facing discipline 
or termination.  However, the tentative draft acknowledges: 
[I]t is an oversimplification to say that consent can be disregarded in the employment 
context.  Some types of employment require reduced expectations of privacy, whether for 
reasons of safety, efficiency, or societal norms.  By taking a type of employment with 
notice of the expectations as to privacy, the employee effectively consents to the 
reasonable requirements of the position, which may entail a reduced expectation of 
privacy. 
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consent.233  In Curtright, also discussed in Part V.C.3, the court inferred 
an employee’s consent to an investigation of his conduct and then 
refused to find any intrusion based on that investigation.234  The court did 
not specify which facts indicated voluntary consent, so one cannot draw 
any broad conclusions from this case. 
Frye v. IBP, Inc., also discussed in Part V.B., affirmed that an 
employee does not consent to all privacy invasions merely by accepting 
employment.235  It also indicated, however, that consent may be inferred 
even if the employee faces the threat of discipline or termination.236  The 
employer in Frye required an employee provide a urine sample for a drug 
test.237  The employee complied, was fired, and then challenged the test 
as an intrusion on seclusion.238  The Frye court agreed with the employer 
that consent to a drug test may be inferred when an employee provides a 
urine sample on request, and the inference is not negated when refusal to 
consent will result in termination or discipline.239  But even though the 
employee submitted to the test, the court did not find the employee’s 
consent was voluntarily given.  Instead the court found that an employee 
does not implicitly agree to any and all demands her employer makes as 
to drug testing simply by accepting employment.240  The consent will be 
limited by the employer’s stated policy on testing.  The employer’s drug 
testing policy in Frye stated it would test an employee if it had 
reasonable suspicion that the employee’s ability to function safely was 
affected by alcohol or drugs.  Because the employer did not have 
reasonable suspicion the employee’s ability to function safely was 
affected, it did not have plaintiff’s voluntary consent to test.241 
                                                          
Id. 
 233.  Curtright v. Ray, No. 90-2034-V, 1991 WL 179385, at *7 (D. Kan. Aug. 23, 1991). 
 234.  Id. 
 235.  15 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1042 (D. Kan. 1996).  Whether consent is a defense to the intrusion or 
whether plaintiff must prove lack of consent is not clear.  See Entrikin, supra note 3.  The 
Curtwright court seemed to place the burden on plaintiff to show lack of consent to prove the 
information sought was private. 
 236.  Frye, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1041. 
 237.  Id. at 1037. 
 238.  Id. at 1038. 
 239.  Id. at 1041. 
 240.  Id. at 1042. 
 241.  Id.  The court did, in any event, approve the test as reasonable even though the employer 
did not follow all aspects of its policy.  The test was not highly offensive to a reasonable person 
because it was justified by the employer’s stated purpose of maintaining a safe place to work.  Id. at 
1042–43. 
2013]      INTRUSION ON SECLUSION IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT 1019 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Kansas courts have not yet developed a clear approach to intrusion 
on seclusion claims in the employment context.  A clear approach to 
these claims must involve a balancing of employer and employee 
interests.  As in the collections context, an intrusion on seclusion analysis 
in the employment context must recognize that each party’s rights are 
qualified.  An employee’s right to privacy is qualified by the employer’s 
legitimate business interests, and the employer’s right to pursue its 
legitimate business interests is qualified by the employee’s right to 
privacy.  To determine if an employer’s invasion of an employee’s zone 
of privacy is highly offensive, courts must determine whether the 
employer’s business interest justifies the scope and manner of its 
invasion.  This balancing of interests in the employment context is 
consistent with Kansas intrusion on seclusion law, with several other 
states’ treatment of inclusion on seclusion in the employment context, 
and with privacy analysis in the employment context under federal law.  
In existing federal cases analyzing Kansas law, courts have implicitly, if 
not explicitly, balanced the parties’ interests.  An explicit balancing will, 
however, develop the law more clearly in the future and provide better 
guidance to employers and employees. 
 
